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PRIORITY AS BETWEEN CORPORATE MORTGAGES AND JUDGMENTS FOR
TORTS ARISING FROM CONTRACT.
It has been stated as a general rule that where contract rela-
tions exist, the parties assume towards each other no duties what-
ever besides those which the contract imposes. Cooley, Torts io6;
McGuire v. Kiveland, 56 Vt. 62. To this proposition there are
the two principal exceptions that on a false warranty either an
action in tort or for breach of contract may be maintained and the
case of common carriers who are obliged by law to carry safely
and are liable in tort for their failure to do so as well as for breach
of contract. Railway Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 619. But though such
is the general rule as between the parties to the contract, it is recog-
nized by high authority that where an act is actionable only be-
tween the wrong-doer and one person as a breach of contract, yet
the wrong-doer may be responsible for the same act as a tort to
another who is thereby injured. Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. lO2.
The distinction between actions of tort and contract has be-
come of great importance in cases arising under legislation subor-
dinating the liens of corporate mortgages to judgments for torts
committed by the corporation, and the U. S. Supreme Court has re-
cently rendered an opinion in an interesting case involving this
question. The case is Guardian Trust & Deposit Co. v. Fisher, 26
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Sup. Ct. 186, arising under the North Carolina Code. In this case
a corporation had contracted with a city to construct waterworks
and supply water and had entered into the performance of the con-
tract. By its failure to keep a sufficient suppy of water on hand.
fire destroyed buildings belonging to individuals who recovered
judgment in the state courts against the corporation "for injury
done by the negligence of the defendant."
The main question presented was whether such judgments
should take precedence as judgments for torts over corporate mort-
gages. It was argued that independently of the contract there
was no duty upon the water company to furnish an adequate supply
of water, that inasmuch as a city owes no such duty to its citizens,
the contract of the city with a water company imposes upon such
company no higher duty than the city itself owes and that for fail-
ure of the company to fulfill its contract, the remedy is for breach
of cofitract alone.
The court, assuming without deciding that the nature of the
causes of action upon which the state judgments were rendered
was open for consideration in the Federal court, applies the under-
lying principle as stated in the Massachusetts case above referred
to, and holds that the water company by its contract with the city,
invites the citizens to avail themselves of its conveniences and to
omit making other arrangements for a supply of water, and there-
by assumes an absolute duty in that regard for breach 'of which it
is liable to individuals in tort. The opinions of the court delivered
by Mr. justice Brewer is well calculated to relieve any obscurity
and doubt which may have heretofore existed as to when an action
for tort will arise out of contract and this decision will be especially
valuable in the determination of cases of this nature, bound to
arise under statutes similar to the one of North Carolina which
it seems to be the present tendency to enact.
LIMITATION ON EXEMPTION OF A STATE FROM TAXATION IMPOSED
BY NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.
In South Carolina v. U. S., 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. n1o, an exceeding-
ly important limitation was imposed on the familiar principle of
constitutional law laid down in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316 and The Collector v. Day, ii Wall. i3, which exempts the
agents and instrumentalities of either government from taxation by
the other on the ground that the power to tax is the power to de-
stroy.
The occasion of the present decision was the refusal of the state
.f South Carolina to pay the federal excise tax on intoxicating
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liquors in the state by its dispensary system. The state claimed
that the dispensary system was an instrumentality of the state and
was therefore exempt from national taxation. The court did not
sustain the contention of the state and drew a clear line of distinc-
tion between those state agencies which are subject to federal taxa-
tion and those which are exempt, holding that the exemption ex-
tends only to those agencies which are of a strictly governmental
character and not to those which are used by the state to carry on
ordinary private business.
The court view with alarm the strong tendency in the country
in favor of the acquisition and management by the public of "pub-
lic utilities." Suppose the states should adopt the extreme views of
some advocates and, by virtue of the police power, assume control
over all those matters subject to internal revenue taxes and also
go into the business of improving foreign goods, they could ser-
iously impair the efficiency of the national government, if the prin-
ciple of exemption is as sweeping as South Carolina claims it is.
When the framers of the federal government gave that govern-
ment complete power over license taxes they never thought that
the states had the power to destroy it by extending their functions.
It is apparent that some check to this dangerous tendency shoull
be established to protect the federal government. To supply this
need the Supreme Court lays down the above principle.
Three of the justices dissented on the ground that, by this rul-
ing "the distinct powers belonging to both national and state
governments are reciprocally placed the one at the mercy of the
other, so as to give to each the potency of destroying the other."
Justice White, in his opinion, points out the absolute power which
the states have over the sale of liquorseven to prevent the same
altogether under the police power. The exercise of the police pow-
er is a governmental function. Therefore when the state takes the
sale of liquor into its own hands which it has a right to do by vir-
tue of the police power, the business should be exempt from taxa-
tion. Otherwise the national government by its power to tax may
destroy the police power of the state.
It would seem that the argument of the court is self-contradic-
tory. It is held that the state has no right indirectly to deprive the
federal government of revenue by assuming control over the sale
of liquor. Yet the same result may be accomplished directly if the
state absolutely prohibits the sale of liquor. In other words the
state may not do indirectly what it has the lawful power to do di-
rectly.
